首席大法官 John Roberts 就聲請釋憲人所提出的「正當程序條款」及「自由權」的主張，火力全開的予以反駁。

聲請釋憲人主張：由正當程序條款所推衍出來的「自由權」，其意義與範圍尚包括「個人自主權」(individual autonomy)，並且應同等地受到憲法的保障。

所謂「個人自主權」，或可界定為「界定及表達自我認知的權利」(define and express their identity)。但即便美國聯邦最高法院接受了聲請釋憲人關於「個人自主權」的主張，卻也同時表示：個人自主權並非全然不受限制。

誠如首席大法官 John Roberts 所言：「個人自主權應該受合理判斷的制約，尤其是在我們對於自由的意義越來越了解後，以上所述的個人自主權的新面貌，可說是越來越清楚了。而今，本院僅僅是依據其個人的觀點，認為同性婚姻應按照同性伴侶的意願而予以合法化，而且，若不允許其合法化，將構成對其個人意願及人格的貶損。這樣的看法或許有其道德上的論據，但僅僅只是像 Lochner 一案裏所採用的政策上的喜好，卻沒有任何憲法上的理論基礎。」
(The constraints it sets are precisely those that accord with its own “reasoned judgment,” informed by its “new insight” into the “nature of injustice,” which was invisible to all who came before but has become clear “as we learn [the] meaning” of liberty. The truth is that today’s decision rests on nothing more than the majority’s own conviction that same-sex couples should be allowed to marry because they want to, and the “it would disparage their choices and diminish their personhood to deny them this right.” Whatever force that belief may have as a matter of moral philosophy, it has no more basis in the Constitution than did the naked policy preferences adopted in Lochner.

聲請釋憲人提出「個人自主權」應受憲法保障的主張，並且受到美國聯邦最高法院的肯定。相對的，首席大法官 John Roberts 對於這個不確定的法律概念，十分感冒，除了強調大法官在具體化「個人自主權」時，必須受制於憲法，不能僅憑著個人的信念與喜好之外，並同時指出：以個人自主權作為承認同性婚姻合法性的論據，實屬邏輯上的一大繆誤。

怎麼說呢？試想：如果承認同性婚姻之合法性，乃屬於對「個人自主權」的保障，那麼，同樣的邏輯也可適用到多夫多妻制。「如果，承認兩名男性或兩名女性得以締結合法的婚姻關係，涉及個人自主權及人性尊嚴，那麼，多夫多妻制也可以說是個人自主權的表現。如果，憲法應保障同性伴侶的婚姻權，以免他們的子女受到嘲笑及輕視，那麼，為什麼不應以同樣的理由，允許人民以多夫多妻制扶養他們的子女？如果，不承認同性婚姻的合法性即屬對於同性戀者的不尊重，那麼，不承認多夫多妻制是否也會構成對於這些人的貶低？」
(If “[t]here is dignity in the bond between two men or two women who seek to marry and in their autonomy to make such profound choices,” why would there be any less dignity in the bond between three people who, in exercising their autonomy, seek to make the profound choice to marry? If a same-sex couple has the constitutional right to marry because their children would otherwise “suffer the stigma of knowing their families are somehow lesser,” why wouldn’t the same reasoning apply to a family of three or more persons raising children? If not having the opportunity to marry “serves to disrespect and subordinate” gay and lesbian couples, who wouldn’t the same “imposition of this disability,” serve to disrespect and subordinate people who find fulfillment in polyamorous relationships?)

首席大法官 John Roberts 進一步解釋：「我無意將同性婚姻與多夫多妻制相提並論。」
(I do not mean to equate marriage between same-sex couples with plural marriages in all respects.)

但是，「當聲請釋憲人於言詞辯論庭被問到多夫多妻制時，很肯定的承認：這個社會並不存在多夫多妻制。同理，這個社會亦不存在同性婚姻啊！」
(When asked about a plural marital union at oral argument, petitioners asserted that a State “doesn’t have such an institution.” But that is exactly to the point: the States at issue here do not have an institution of same-sex marriage, either.)

哈哈！很有意思的辯證吧！

最後，首席大法官 John Roberts 於結論中指出：「簡言之，這些與『婚姻權』有關的案例，都只能支持某些州就婚姻所設限制，依婚姻的傳統定義，違反了正當程序；但這些案例均未涉及命各州改變婚姻定義之問題。聲請釋憲人及本院決議亦均未提及任何相關案例或法律基礎，足以提供任何的憲法基礎。」
(In short, the “right to marry” cases stand for the important but limited proposition that particular restrictions on access to marriage as traditionally defined violate due process. These precedents say nothing at all about a right to make s State change its definition of marriage, which is the right petitioners actually seek here. Neither petitioners nor the majority cites a single case or other legal source providing any basis for such a constitutional right.)