大法官解釋 釋字第744號 |
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| 公佈日期：20170106 |
| 解釋爭點 |
| 化粧品衛生管理條例第二十四條第二項及第三十條第一項就違反同條例第二十四條第二項為處罰之部分，是否違憲？ |
| [17] 這無異是告訴人民：會不會拉肚子，先吃再說，政府會事後究責；但棺材內的人在化粧前，政府會事前審查！ [18] 解釋理由書第5段最末幾行認定含藥化粧品廣告之事前審查手段違憲，理由與第4段類似。 [19] 一般而言，在適用嚴格審查標準時，比例原則的適合性和衡平性這兩個次原則，原本就無用武之地，而只有必要性次原則才是真正具有殺傷力的嚴格審查標準。 [20] 美國法對於藥品廣告，也只要求「電視」廣告需要事前送審。21 U.S.C.§353c: “(a) The Secretary may require the submission of any television advertisement for a drug (including the script, story board, rough, or a completed video production of the television advertisement) to the Secretary for review under this section not later than 45 days before dissemination of the television advertisement⋯⋯.”但主管機關並無權力直接或要求變更送審之廣告內容，而只能要求業者將應強制標示的資訊（如嚴重副作用）納入其廣告中。21 U.S.C. §353c: “⋯⋯⋯⋯(b) In conducting a review of a television advertisement under this section, the Secretary may make recommendations with respect to information included in the label of the drug— (1) on changes that are— (A) necessary to protect the consumer good and well-being; or (B) consistent with prescribing information for the product under review; and (2) if appropriate and if information exists, on statements for inclusion in the advertisement to address the specific efficacy of the drug as it relates to specific population groups, including elderly populations, children, and racial and ethnic minorities. (c) Except as provided by subsection (e), this section does not authorize the Secretary to make or direct changes in any material submitted pursuant to subsection (a).⋯⋯⋯⋯ (e) (1) In conducting a review of a television advertisement under this section, if the Secretary determines that the advertisement would be false or misleading without a specific disclosure about a serious risk listed in the labeling of the drug involved, the Secretary may require inclusion of such disclosure in the advertisement.⋯⋯” [21] 這也是美國最高法院判決強調的審查重點之一，see e.g. , Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U. S. 268, 273 (1951) (“[T]he lack of standards in the license-issuing “practice” renders that “practice” a prior restraint in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that the completely arbitrary and discriminatory refusal to grant the permits was a denial of equal protection.”); Kunz v. New York, 340 U. S. 290, 293 (1951) (“[A]n ordinance which gives an administrative official discretionary power to control in advance the right of citizens to speak on religious matters on the streets of New York. As such, the ordinance is clearly invalid as a prior restraint on the exercise of First Amendment rights.”). |
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