大法官解釋 釋字第760號 |
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| 公佈日期：2018/1/26 |
| 解釋爭點 |
| 警察人員人事條例第11條第2項之規定，對警察三等特考及格之一般生，是否形成職務任用資格之不利差別待遇？ |
| [6] 關於「間接歧視」之概念，See, e.g., Article 2 (2) 1 (b) of Council Directive 2000/43/EC（歐盟反種族歧視指令）（“indirect discrimination shall be taken to occur where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons of a racial or ethnic origin at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons, unless that provision, criterion or practice is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary.”）；ECtHR（歐洲人權法院）defines indirect discrimination as “a general policy or measure which is apparently neutral but has disproportionately prejudicial effects on persons or groups of persons who ⋯⋯ are identifiable only on the basis of an ethnic criterion, may be considered discriminatory notwithstanding that it is not specifically aimed at that group... unless that measure is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate, necessary and proportionate.” Oršuš and Others v. Croatia (App. No. 15766/03), Judgment of 16 March 2010, para 150；陳靜慧，〈歐洲人權法院及歐洲法院對於間接歧視概念之適用與實踐〉，《憲法解釋之理論與實踐》第九輯，頁397-398（2017年4月）。 See also generally, S. Forshaw ＆ M. Pilgerstorfer, Direct and Indirect Discrimination: Is There Something in Between, 37 INDUS. LAW JOURNAL 347 (2008)；A. J. Morris, On the Normative Foundation of Indirect Discrimination Law: Understanding the Competing Models of Discrimination Law as Aristotelian Form of Justice, 15 OXFORD JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 199 (1995)；Christa Tobler, LIMITS AND POTENTIAL OF THE CONCEPT OF INDIRECT DISCRIMINATION (EC Report, 2008)（見，最後瀏覽日2018/01/26）. [7] 例如：某項公職考試之考試規則規定，凡身高190公分且體重90公斤以上者皆可報考，然實際實施之結果，符合前述體格要求之男性遠多於女性，而考試機關又無法證明該項體格要求具有正當理由。又如某項公職考試某一科目因測試之內容特殊，致考試結果具有某種宗教信仰者（或具備某種語言背景者）錄取之比例遠高於其他宗教信仰者（或其他語言背景者），而考試機關無法證明該考科測試內容具有正當理由。 [8] 參見監察院91內正字第38號糾正案文。 [9] 參見考試院98考台訴決字第143號訴願決定書。 [10] See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977)("Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.")；Washington v. Davis , 426 U.S. 229 (1976)( "a law or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, [is not] unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact.") 反之，歐洲人權法院、歐洲法院、美洲人權法院及聯合國人權事務委員會皆認為，個案中被推定為「間接歧視」之措施是否基於「歧視之意圖」所為，要非所問。參見陳靜慧，前揭註（5），頁398-399，註[35]。 [11] 參見本院釋字290號解釋（動員戡亂時期公職人員選舉罷免法第32條第1項有關各級民意代表候選人學、經歷之限制，與憲法尚無牴觸。惟此項學、經歷之限制，應隨國民之教育普及加以檢討，如認為仍有維持之必要，亦宜重視其實質意義，並斟酌就學有實際困難者，而為適當之規定，此當由立法機關為合理之裁量）；釋字第468號解釋（總統副總統選罷法為保證連署人數確有同法第23條第4項所定人數二分之一以上，由被連署人依同條第1項提供保證金新台幣一百萬元，並未逾越立法裁量之範圍，與憲法第23條規定尚無違背）。 [12] 參見本席本院釋字第694號解釋之〈部分協同暨部分不同意見書〉、釋字第696號解釋之〈協同意見書〉及釋字第701號解釋之〈部分協同暨部分不同意見書〉。 |
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